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The deadliest outbreak of Ebola the world has ever seen occurred in 2014.  The virus spread rapidly 
throughout Guinea, Liberia and Sierra 
Leone, leaving more than 11,000 dead 
and causing countless more deaths by 
devastating already weak health care 
systems. Although highly contagious 
and deadly in its own right, the reasons 
for so much devastation can in part 
be found in the broader political and 
economic context. In analysing and 
unpacking the contributing factors 
to the outbreak, narrow debates 
confined to disease control and the 
realm of medical and epidemiological 
practitioners are insufficient. The 
ongoing Ebola outbreak illustrates how 
an emphasis on security and profit 
framed both the conditions for the 
outbreak and the  response to it. 
There is no treatment available 
for such a deadly disease due to a 
global economic system that prioritises 
profit over public good. Nowhere 
is this more starkly evident than in 
the pharmaceutical industry. Ebola 
had never been considered a priority 
for big pharmaceutical companies, 
as it was perceived as affecting only 
a limited number of economically 
disadvantaged patients in short-lived 
and remote outbreaks in Africa. The 
research into finding a treatment 
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Patients in the Ebola outbreak were left 
reliant on pharmaceutical industries favouring 
their own profit margins, local governments 
protecting their economic interests and UN 
mechanisms failing to respond to emergencies.









om for Ebola was informed through the 
prism of Ebola posing security risks to 
the ‘developed’ world, and seldom 
considered a disease affecting patients 
in countries devastated by colonialism 
and conflict. The combination of profit-
driven pharmaceutical companies and 
security-focused government research 
resulted in African Ebola patients being 
viewed as unprofitable and unworthy 
of sufficient investment. 
It was similar neo-liberal economic 
models that arguably resulted in 
a weakening of health systems in 
the affected countries. The Ebola 
affected countries have all been 
part of International Monetary Fund 
programmes, which throughout past 
decades have favoured decreased 
public sector spending, user fees for 
health services, decentralised health 
care systems and a wage structure that 
makes it difficult to remunerate skilled 
medical professionals. This came 
after years of brutal conflict that had 
left health systems overstretched and 
unable to develop adequately. In the 
countries worst affected by Ebola, the 
existing health systems were already 
stretched, understaffed, and struggling 
to meet the basic needs of their people. 
Based on the structural fragility 
of these health systems, one would 
assume that the international response 
at the outset of the outbreak would 
have matched the urgency that 
characterised the rapid spread of a 
virus without a cure. However, this was 
not the case. 
Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF) – 
alongside national health authorities – 
carried the bulk of the Ebola response. 
The organisation raised the alarm as 
early as March 2014, referring to the 
outbreak as unprecedented and calling 
for additional support. Nonetheless, in 
the early days of the outbreak response 
was marked by the governments of the 
region downplaying the outbreak and 
the World Health Organisation (WHO) 
disputing the seriousness of MSF’s 
attempts to raise the alarm. In April, 
the WHO questioned whether the 
outbreak patterns were any different 
from previous outbreaks. And on 10 
May, Guinean media reported the 
president of Guinea complaining that 
MSF was spreading panic in order 
to raise funds. In Sierra Leone, the 
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government instructed the WHO 
to report only laboratory-confirmed 
deaths in June, reducing the death 
toll count in the country by excluding 
probable and suspected cases. In some 
cases, responding was made even 
more difficult for MSF teams who were 
refused access to contact lists and had 
to start from scratch in investigating 
which villages were affected and 
where and how to respond. Faced 
with an explosion of Ebola cases in 
the summer, the Liberian authorities 
were transparent about the spread of 
cases, though few outside the country 
stepped forward to respond to their 
urgent requests for help.
The Ebola outbreak proved to be 
an exceptional event that exposed 
the reality of how inefficient and 
slow health and aid systems are to 
respond to emergencies. In practice, 
the World Health Organisation as an 
institution proved inefficient and ill-
suited for action. In the initial stages of 
the outbreak, WHO leadership spent 
more time talking down the scale of 
the crisis, than actually reacting to the 
crisis. This was due to pressure from 
national governments in the affected 
countries, who were concerned 
about the economic implications 
of an outbreak, as well as due to 
internal politics and poor capacity 
within the organisation. It was through 
this approach that WHO became a 
critical component in what MSF has 
referred to as the ‘global coalition of 
inaction.’ 
It was only when the first patients 
emerged in the US and Europe that 
the so called ‘international community’ 
took notice of the sheer scale of the 
crisis. Thousands of dead patients in 
West Africa were not enough to catalyse 
action – but a few patients crossing into 
the ‘developed world’ caused a mass 
mobilisation. Ebola became a risk to 
national security. Thus the approach 
to Ebola continued to be dictated by a 
security logic. It was abundantly clear 
that when it came to Ebola, ‘black lives’ 
did not matter enough for those with 
the capacity to respond. 
Meanwhile in Liberia, MSF was 
facing a catastrophic situation. In spite 
of having established the biggest Ebola 
management centre in history and 
having deployed the full extent of the 
organisation’s emergency capacity, 
MSF was still turning away patients at 
the door of the hospital due to a lack 
of space. Patients were dying on the 
doorstep of the organisation’s treatment 
centres. It was due to this catastrophic 
reality that MSF took the unusual 
decision to call for the deployment of 
the bio-security capacities that existed 
primarily in national armies. The need 
to make this call of last resort reflected 
both the overwhelming situation and 
the reality that prior investment and 
interest in Ebola had been limited to a 
security focused framework. 
After having sought agreement with 
the heads of state of Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, and Guinea, MSF called for 
field hospitals with isolation wards 
to be scaled up, trained personnel to 
be dispatched, mobile laboratories to 
be deployed to improve diagnostics, 
and air bridges established to move 
people and material to and within 
West Africa.
When the military from western 
countries finally deployed in October, 
the response was a disappointment. 
The majority of the military effort was 
limited to support, coordination and 
logistics for the efforts of international 
aid organisations and local authorities. 
The military focused on establishing 
treatment facilities for both national 
and international health workers – 
probably to avoid having to transfer 
foreign aid workers back to Europe and 
the US and risk infections. Although 
very much needed, the medical 
facilities built to treat local and foreign 
healthcare workers did not offer 
direct care to the wider community. 
The African Union played a positive 
role in responding to cases in the 
countries neighbouring the epicentre 
of the Ebola outbreak – but they did 
not have the capacity to swiftly deploy 
at the level required within the three 
most devastated countries. Once the 
response took some shape, and means 
were made available, the AU focused 
on mobilising human resources among 
its member states, resulting in a unique 
deployment of hundreds of African 
health care workers.
At the same time the UN, under 
increasing pressure, compensated for 
its own internal failings by creating 
a stand-alone structure to deal with 
the outbreak. The establishment of 
a United Nations Mission for Ebola 
Emergency Response (UNMEER), 
was the first ever UN mission to 
be established as a response to an 
outbreak. However, as assistance 
and support was mobilised, the lack 
of coordination and leadership that 
remained even after the establishment 
of UNMEER meant that the measures 
put in place to stem the outbreak, 
remained inflexible and ill-adapted 
to the reality of an ever changing and 
dynamic situation. 
Since the beginning of May 2015, 
after 42 days with no recorded cases 
of Ebola, Liberia was declared Ebola 
free. However, 200 Liberian health 
workers died from the virus and the 
health system has been decimated. In 
addition to this, the fight against Ebola 
is not yet over in Sierra Leone and 
Guinea. 
International aid responses are slow 
and ill-adapted and the economic fallout 
of declaring emergencies for countries 
still struggling under the burden of debt 
often deters these governments from 
declaring an emergency or making an 
immediate call for outside help. The 
most vulnerable patients are therefore 
left relying on pharmaceutical 
industries favouring their own profit 
margins, local governments protecting 
their economic interests and UN 
mechanisms failing to respond to 
emergencies. In the case of the Ebola 
outbreak, this resulted in a situation 
whereby those with the willingness to 
respond were overstretched and those 
with the capacity to respond were too 
slow, owing to the considerations of 
their own self-interest. 
To avoid this in the future it 
is necessary to remove response 
mechanisms from decision making 
processes that are reliant on economic 
interest and national security. Those 
committed to fighting future epidemics 
should commit to de-linking their 
responses from their own security 
interests. This commitment would be 
an acknowledgement of the specific 
context in which disease outbreaks 
occur and would ensure that patients 
are put before profit or national donor 
self-interest. Only then will we ensure 
the willingness to prevent a future 
outbreak of this kind. ■
